Responsible Development and the United States National Nanotechnology Initiative
The goals of the U.S. National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) include supporting responsible development of nanotechnology. As elaborated on in core NNI documents, this involves addressing environmental, health, and safety (EHS) concerns; engaging in public education and outreach; developing a nanotechnology workforce; and responding to other ethical, legal, and social issues (OELSI). However, the documents never adequately articulate what the OELSI are; why they matter; or how they relate to the rest of the NNI research, development, and implementation program. If fact, reference to them is usually limited to a few sentences at the end of a section addressing the other aspects of responsible development. An example of this is the Societal Implications section of the chapter entitled "How Can We Do Better?" of The National Nanotechnology Initiative at Five Years: Assessment and Recommendations of the National Nanotechnology Advisory Panel:
Finally, there is an expanding need for activities that are focused on ethical, legal, and other societal implications beyond just the environmental and health effects. The NNI should participate in appropriate dialogues with stakeholders, beyond the research and technical communities. (President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, 2005, p. 43) There is no indication of what the implications are, who the stakeholders and communities are, how dialogue might take place, what the dialogues are intended to accomplish, or how attention to the implications or dialogues might inform the nanotechnology research and development program or otherwise contribute to shaping government policy, regulatory capacity, or institutions. 1 The work actually being done by "responsible development" researchers, both funded by and independent from the NNI, is similarly focused almost exclusively on environmental health and safety (including associated regulatory capacity and best research/workplace practices) and education and outreach (involving educating the public about what nanotechnology is, workforce preparation, and encouraging public acceptance of nanotechnology). 2 The few exceptions are the issues of privacy, human enhancement, and distributive justice.
3 However, as discussed below, these are only a few of the often referenced but rarely specified OELSI.
In this article, I discuss one important class of OELSI, social context issues (SCI), which emerge from nanotechnology's interaction with problematic features of the social, ethical, cultural, and institutional contexts into which it is emerging. I begin by arguing that it is not too soon to begin identifying and addressing these issues. I then provide examples of two justice-related SCI-environmental justice and the social justice dimensions of human enhancement. These examples demonstrate that addressing SCI is crucial to achieving responsible development of nanotechnology. They also indicate the magnitude of the challenges involved in doing so. I conclude by reflecting on the implications of these considerations and by responding to some possible objections.
My intent is not to diminish the significance and urgency of proactively identifying and addressing possible EHS concerns, engaging in public outreach and education, or promoting workforce and scientific/ economic infrastructure development. 4 Rather, it is to demonstrate that despite all the important work being done in these areas, much of it funded and organized through the NNI, attending to them does not exhaust what is required for responsible development of nanotechnology.
5
Not Yet in Focus?
Some have argued that it is not yet possible to articulate, assess, and respond to the OELSI raised by nanotechnology because it is too early in the "nanotechnology revolution" to tell what they are. This common position was recently reiterated in A Matter of Size: Triennial Review of the National Nanotechnology Initiative:
Currently, ethical considerations specific to nanotechnology have not come into focus, yet the concerns were articulated by experts in bioethics and engineering ethics and others at the workshops held during this study. . . . Although near-term and tangible ethical concerns related to use of nanotechnology have yet to be determined, it is not too early now to think about how to inform, communicate with, and engage the public to ensure broad consideration of what responsible development of nanotechnology might entail from a societal perspective. (National Research Council, 2006, pp. 87-88) This position is puzzling for several reasons. First, it is puzzling that the social and ethical issues needing attention should be limited to those "specific to nanotechnology." It may be that nanotechnologies raise familiar social and ethical issues, perhaps in novel or complicated forms, either themselves or in interaction with other types of technologies, which need to be addressed because they are significant social and ethical issues, whether or not they are unique or specific to nanotechnology.
Second, it is puzzling that the ethical considerations regarding nanotechnology remain "not yet in focus," even though they have been "articulated by experts." One possible explanation for this is that experts are articulating types of potential concerns, although particular instantiations of those concerns involving particular nanotechnologies are not yet in focus, because the relevant sorts of technologies are not yet developed or disseminated. This is possible because even if the token challenges are not instantiated (e.g., a particular nanotechnology that is being used to compromise personal privacy in a particular way), there are substantial resources for making reasonable predictions about what the types of social and ethical challenges associated with nanotechnology are likely to be (e.g., that some nanotechnologies might be used for surreptitious collection of personal information and that there may be illicit or illegal sharing of personal information collected legitimately by nanotechnologies) (Rodrigues, 2006) . These resources include experience with previous emerging technologies and the challenges they posed; knowledge about the characteristic features of nanotechnology; knowledge of the particular social, cultural, and institutional contexts in which nanotechnologies are being developed, implemented, disseminated, and regulated; and information about the probable timeline for the application and commercialization of many types of products, devices, and processes incorporating nanotechnology. 6 In fact, these are exactly the resources that are being drawn on to identify and address proactively possible EHS challenges posed by nanotechnology (see, e.g., National Science and Technology Council, Committee on Technology, Nanoscale Science, Engineering, and Technology Subcommittee (2006); Taylor (2006); Maynard (2006b) ; Renn and Roco (2006) . Very little is known now about the toxicity and mobility of particular nanoparticles (the tokens), even though there are strong reasons to believe (on the basis of the types of considerations listed above) that there will be substantial environmental, health, and safety challenges associated with nanoparticles (the type).
Third, given the foregoing, it is puzzling that the report should move so readily from the absence of detailed instantiations of token problems to the conclusion that what we can do is engage, inform, and educate the public "to ensure broad consideration of what responsible development of nanotechnology might entail from a societal perspective," whatever that means. Consider the following analogous line of reasoning with respect to the EHS challenges of nanoparticles: Because the toxicity and mobility properties of particular nanoparticles are not known in detail, we cannot yet begin to assess, much less modify current regulatory institutions or workplace practices for their capacity to respond to the possible EHS challenges posed by nanoparticles or nanotechnology more generally. This line of reasoning is mistaken precisely because there is a basis for reasonable expectations regarding some of the types of challenges that nanotechnology is likely to pose with respect to EHS. For example, because the chemical and physical properties of nanoparticles can vary substantially with size, configuration, orientation, and shape (because of their high surface-to-mass ratios and the significance of quantum effects at the nanoscale), generalizing about toxicity and mobility properties of nanoparticles on the basis of type of substance, as is done by the Environmental Protection Agency under the Toxic Substances Control Act and the Food and Drug Administration with respect to materials generally recognized as safe, is likely to be problematic. Therefore, the role that such generalizations play within these regulatory institutions (as well as workplace and laboratory practice) can and should be reconsidered now, proactively. Indeed, many organizations, and to some extent the regulatory agencies themselves, are beginning to do so. 7 So, it is not the case that because the particular EHS challenges of particular nanotechnologies are not yet determined that all there is to do is engage, inform, and educate the public "to ensure broad consideration of what responsible development of nanotechnology might entail from a societal perspective."
The same holds for other (i.e., non-EHS) aspects of the responsible development of nanotechnology that concern governmental capacity-for example, the capacity of the United States Patent Office to handle the expected influx and complexities of patent applications for nanotechnological innovations. It also applies to SCI, which concern social and institutional structures and arrangements-the contexts into which nanotechnology is emerging-as much or more than they do the particular features of the nanotechnologies themselves. Many of these issues can begin to be addressed, in ways not at all limited to public outreach and communication, absent knowledge of particular nanotechnologies and token issue instantiations.
For these reasons, it is not too soon to begin identifying and addressing the OELSI, and the SCI in particular, associated with nanotechnology.
Social Context Issues
SCI come into focus when, rather than focusing narrowly on the practice of nanotechnologists or the features or functions of nanotechnologies, the contexts into which nanotechnology is emerging and critiques of those contexts are brought to the fore. There is a host of SCI, which is not surprising given the pervasiveness of technology, the myriad ways in which it shapes our social experience and contributes to determining the human situation, and that nanotechnology is a generaluse technology-that is, it is not restricted to one or a few fields or types of application. As the passage from A Matter of Size quoted earlier suggests, those who specialize in social and ethical analysis and assessment will be appropriately positioned to identify SCI that emerge from nanotechnology's introduction into, or affect, those contexts that they study-bioethics, environmental ethics, medical ethics, global justice, engineering ethics, social justice, business ethics, and gender studies, for example. Here I focus on two justice-related SCI: environmental justice and the social justice dimensions of human enhancement.
Nanotechnology and Environmental Justice
Environmental justice concerns the distribution of environmental burdens and benefits. 8 Environmental burdens are land uses, facilities, or activities that diminish the quality of a community's environment-for example, agricultural waste streams, industrial pollution, toxic waste sites, incinerators, waster transfer stations, refineries, transportation depots, mine tailings, and sewage treatment facilities. Environmental benefits are the goods associated with environmental burdens-that is, the commodities, experiences and wealth, the production of which generates the environmental burdens.
Environmental burdens and benefits are not equally distributed. For example, in Massachusetts, low-income communities (median income less than $39,525) face a cumulative exposure rate to hazardous facilities and sites that is 2.5 to 4 times greater than higher income communities, and communities with high-minority populations (greater than 25%) face a cumulative exposure rate that is more than 20 times greater than communities with low-minority populations (less than 5%) (Faber & Krieg, 2005, pp. 9-10) . The situation in Massachusetts is not atypical. It is representative of what has been found in other states, nationally in the United States, and globally: low-income communities, those that receive fewer of the environmental benefits, and high-minority communities are disproportionately exposed to environmental burdens. 9 What does this have to do with nanotechnology? One possible answer is that, although definitely unequal, probably unjust, 10 and possibly a form of discrimination, 11 it has nothing to do with nanotechnology. Nanotechnology is not the cause of the obtaining distribution of environmental burdens and benefits, and appeals to nanotechnology do not otherwise explain it. Moreover, there is not anything inherently unjust, let alone particularly so, about the capacity to design, control, and construct on the nanoscale. When the features of nanotechnology are considered, the environmental justice issue does not appear to be a nanotechnology issue.
The central mistake in this response is that it is not possible to identify the social and ethical dimensions of nanotechnology by considering it in itself, abstracted from its social context. The environmental justice issue is relevant to nanotechnology because a significant feature of the social context into which nanotechnology is emerging is that this inequality is allowed, and in many ways enabled and encouraged, by obtaining social institutions and practices. In the United States, these include, for example, the role of cost-benefit analysis in facility siting decisions, zoning and land planning legacies from segregation, racism in job hiring and advancement, NIMBY (not in my backyard) effects, differential political influence, redlining in insurance and lending practices, discriminatory use of restrictive covenants, and corporate influence and the marginalization of local communities in land use decisions (Bullard, 1994; Westra & Lawson, 2001) . Nanotechnology, like all technologies, is not separable from its social context. Technologies emerge from society and are made possible and encouraged by society-they depend on previous innovations and often receive social support in forms ranging from direct funding to cultural valuing, for example. They are implemented in, and disseminated through, society. They transform society by solving problems (and creating them), realizing novel ways for humans to go about the world, and altering the human situation on which many social and ethical norms are predicated, for example. The cumulative upshot from these considerations is that there is no such thing as nanotechnology as such, abstracted from society. Or, more precisely, even if there is nanotechnology in the abstract, contemplating it as such is not much help in identifying and responding to the social and ethical issues associated with the ongoing "nanotechnology revolution." All actual nanotechnology, present or future, is socially situated nanotechnology. When it comes to identifying and addressing the social and ethical issues associated with actual nanotechnology, what is relevant are the obtaining forms of practice and innovations currently or possibly realized in obtaining or possible social contexts.
In the obtaining social contexts, environmental justice is an issue. Moreover, it is clear that many nanotechnologies (although, of course, not all) and nanomanufacturing processes are going to result in both environmental burdens and environmental benefits. Because of this, the social and ethical challenges associated with these nanotechnologies and nanomanufacturing processes include environmental justice. The implication for the efforts for responsible development of nanotechnology is that these are incomplete if they do not address the issue of environmental justice. That environmental injustice is not somehow inherent in nanotechnology, and nanomanufacturing does not mean that particular forms and types of them cannot be implicated in, contribute to, or exacerbate environmental injustice and be problematic insofar as they do so.
Alternatively, some nanotechnologies and nanomanufacturing processes might be developed and disseminated in forms or ways that help to mitigate the impact of distributive environmental injustice by, for example, reducing the ecological harm and locally undesirable land uses associated with production of some types of consumer goods or by making environmental remediation more effective and less costly. 12 Part of the promise of nanotechnology (or, more precisely, among the promises made by proponents of nanotechnology) is the positive environmental impact it could have. Nanotechnologies might provide clean energies; environmentally benign manufacturing processes; highly efficient and effective environmental remediation; vastly improved environmental monitoring and data collection; and dramatically better prevention, detection, and treatment of diseases, including "environmental illnesses" such as asthma and many cardiovascular diseases (EPA, 2007; National Science and Technology Council, Committee on Technology, Interagency Working Group on Nanoscience, Engineering and Technology, 2000; Roco & Bainbridge, 2001) . Promoting the realization, implementation, and dissemination of such technologies in appropriate ways would contribute to socially responsible development of nanotechnology, because responsible development involves both avoiding undesirable effects and promoting the social good.
Just as nanotechnologies and nanomanufacturing processes are not inherently environmentally unjust, neither are they inherently environmentally just. Whether they are likely to exacerbate or alleviate environmental injustice in the obtaining social context depends on, for example, which nanotechnologies and nanomanufacturing processes are realized; how they are implemented, disseminated, and situated (and who According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) inspector general (2004) and the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (2003, 2004) , the relevant agencies and administrations are yet to put into place a comprehensive strategic plan for realizing the order, establish performance measures for assessing implementation, make the order part of the EPA's core mission (the agency has instead de-emphasized the disproportionate exposure of minority and low-income communities in its approach to addressing environmental hazards), and failed to increase participation of affected minority and low-income communities in meaningful decisionmaking processes. 13 The effort also would be advanced by such things as aggressive toxics reductions mandates (e.g., strict command and control limits or polluters paying for the health and ecosystem services costs of their pollution); increased green chemistry research and implementation support (at both state and federal levels); standardizing life-cycle analysis, environmentally benign manufacturing, and end-of-life (or cradle-to-cradle) consideration in technology and production process designs (e.g., by incorporating them into professional standards and engineering curricula) and in regulatory review (and having these consideration inform funding priorities at the relevant state and federal agencies); implementing policies and procedures that encourage participation and increase the influence of local communities in zoning and industrial permitting processes; and more effective enforcement of antidiscrimination laws in areas such as employment and lending.
The above is not an account of individually necessary or jointly sufficient conditions for ensuring that nanotechnology reduces rather than exacerbates environmental injustice. But it does indicate the scope of the challenge associated with developing nanotechnology in a socially responsible way with regard to environmental justice. Because the social and ethical dimensions of nanotechnology are determined by the characteristic features of nanotechnology and the social contexts into which it is emerging, addressing them includes thinking about product design and production processes, but that is not enough. To fully address the social and ethical issues associated with nanotechnology requires addressing the socially and ethically problematic features of the social contexts into which nanotechnology is emerging. Because nanotechnology is emerging into social contexts in which environmental justice is a significant issue, effectively addressing the social and ethical dimensions of nanotechnology requires effective addressing the factors, from externalization of pollution costs to discriminatory lending, that give rise to environmental injustice.
Nanotechnology, Human Enhancement, and Social Justice
Human enhancement technologies are technologies that substantially improve or augment some core cognitive, physical, or psychological human capacity or that enable some novel and useful capacity not standard among human biological capacities. Human enhancement through technology is nothing new. Education technologies, computational devices, nutritional supplements, devices that assist in mental and physical training, steroids, drugs, and communication systems are each a type of human enhancement technology (Bostrom & Sandberg, in press) .
Nanotechnology is likely to increase substantially our ability to enhance ourselves. For example, the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF) supports a research program that explores the possibilities for people and society at the intersection of nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology, and computer science (Roco & Bainbridge, 2002a ). The expectation is that "converging technologies integrated from the nanoscale would achieve tremendous improvements in human abilities, and enhance social achievement" (Roco & Montemagno, 2004, p. vii) . According to Mihail Roco (2004) , chair of the National Science and Technology Council's Subcommittee on Nanoscale Science, Engineering and Technology and senior adviser for nanotechnology at NSF, Accelerated improvement of human performance has become possible at the individual and collective levels. We have arrived at the moment when we can measure signals from and interact with human cells and the nervous system, begin to replace and regenerate body parts, and build machines and other products with finesse suitable for direct interaction with human tissue and the nervous system. (p. 3)
Among the "key visionary ideas" of the researchers involved in the program are "expanding human cognition and communication" and "improving human health and physical capabilities" with products placed both inside and outside the human body (Roco & Bainbridge, 2002b, p. 17) .
14 Some of the ethical issues raised by such enhancement technologies concern the technologies themselves (e.g., that they may involve significant modifications to "human nature") and the effects of the enhancement on those that are enhanced (e.g., whether enhancement would, in fact, be beneficial and whether parental authority extends to the enhancement of their children) (Birch, 2005; Bostrom, in press; Bostrom & Ord, 2006; Savulescu, 2001) . However, others concern the effects of the availability and dissemination of these technologies through society, including whether they would be justice enhancing or justice impairing (Birch, 2005; Bostrom & Sandberg, in press; Buchanan, Brock, Daniels, & Wikler, 2000; Wenz, 2005) .
One approach to thinking about the last type of issue is to try to identify principles of justice that would operate over and guide development, dissemination, and regulation of such enhancement technologies and determine what the effects of the technologies would be in a society that meets those standards. 15 However, this approach does not fully answer the crucial question: Would these enhancement technologies be justice enhancing or justice impairing in actual societies into which they are being introduced? Wenz (2005) , for example, has argued convincingly that many forms of enhancement, including genetic enhancements, that might not be justice impairing in adequately just societies would almost certainly be significantly justice impairing in societies in which there are substantial preexisting inequalities in terms of, for example, material resources, opportunities for social advancement, access to technology, access to information, access to education, and access to health care-and, perhaps more significant, in which there are social and political institutions (such as tax policies, inheritance laws, education funding, health care policies, international trade organizations, and subsidy policies) that allow, enable, perpetuate, and promote them. Therefore, in most actual societies, addressing the social and ethical issues associated with nanotechnology-enabled forms of human enhancement requires addressing those already problematic features of society that give rise to the relevant inequalities that are likely to result in their implementation and dissemination being justice impairing.
The social justice dimension of human enhancement illustrates, once again, that the social and ethical challenges associated with nanotechnology cannot be adequately understood by considering nanotechnologies in themselves or by considering them within the context of an idealized or theoretical society that meets appropriate standards of justice. There are significant challenges that emerge only upon critical study of the relevant features of the social contexts into which nanotechnology is emerging and that cannot be resolved by technology design, technological fixes, and risk management alone. Responding to them requires addressing also the problematic social, institutional, or cultural components.
Implications
The central claims defended above are these: (a) The social and ethical challenges of nanotechnology can be fully identified only if both the characteristic features of nanotechnologies and the social contexts into which they are emerging are considered. (b) When this is done, a host of significant SCI, or issues that arise as a result of problematic features of the social contexts into which nanotechnology is emerging, become salient. (c) These issues can be addressed only by remedying the problematic features of the social contexts, which cannot be accomplished by technology design or risk management alone. (d) The NNI's conceptualization and operationalization of responsible development does not adequately recognize the significance of SCI to responsible development. (e) Therefore, although the NNI's commitment to responsible development of nanotechnology may be sincere, innovative, and substantial, it is not yet comprehensive and needs to be expanded with respect to identifying and addressing SCI. 16 What has not been argued for is that these considerations justify a moratorium on nanotechnology research and development, or even a slowing of it, until the problematic features of the relevant social contexts are resolved. Nor has it been argued that these considerations make nanotechnology, or even particular types or applications of nanotechnologies, unjust or unethical all things considered. Such conclusions are beyond what the considerations raised above warrant. The point, rather, is that if the goal is to maximize nanotechnology as a social good-to have it contribute, as far as possible, to promoting human flourishing in a just and environmentally sustainable way-then the other ethical, legal, and social issues, in particular those related to social context, need to be identified and, as far as possible, addressed.
One possible response to this might be that the problematic features that give rise to SCI are too ubiquitous, too institutionally and culturally entrenched, and too multifaceted to reasonably expect that they could be resolved. But although it is, of course, true that it is not likely that all SCI will be adequately resolved, this does not imply that we ought not do what we can to address them as far as possible. To conclude that we ought not concern ourselves with them because they cannot be fully resolved would be to commit the perfectionist fallacy. We ought to try to reduce environmental injustice, even if it is not likely to be entirely eliminated. The point of considering and responding to social and ethical considerations is to make progress, not realize perfection (Jamieson, 2002) .
Another possible response might be that these issues, although significant, are not within the purview of the NNI, which is primarily a science and technology research and development program. This response is misguided for several reasons. First, the primary goal of the NNI is to promote nanotechnology in a way that, as far as possible, benefits humanity in general and U.S. citizens in particular. This is why there is already a substantial commitment to responsible development within the NNI. Because addressing SCI is a significant component of achieving responsible development, addressing them does fall within the scope of the NNI. Second, if addressing the SCI did not technically fall within the scope of the NNI, this would not diminish their significance as social and ethical issues associated with nanotechnology in need of attention and response. Rather, it would indicate a problematic limitation of the NNI. Third, the NNI represents a significant opportunity for addressing many of the features that give rise to the SCI. After all, it is not often that there is a coordinated federal program that includes all frontline federal regulatory agencies and in which there is widespread recognition of the need to develop adequate governmental capacity to realize the potential of a possibly socially transformative technology for promoting the public good.
17
Notes 14. A more aggressive human enhancement effort is being undertaken by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Information on DARPA's programs can be found on its Web site at http://www.darpa.mil/body/off_programs.html.
15. Buchanan, Borck, Daniels, and Wikler (2000) took this approach with respect to genetic enhancements.
16. As mentioned earlier, the best effort in this direction is Roco and Bainbridge (2005) .
17. This is not to claim that it is likely that there will be widespread attempts to address the social context issues at the federal level. It is only to claim that however favorable or unfavorable the conditions currently are, they are about as good as they are likely to be (reference withheld).
